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Abstract
This paper describes an experiment to investigate user perceptions of the usability and 
security of single-factor and two-factor authentication methods in automated telephone 
banking. In a controlled experiment with 62 banking customers a knowledge-based, 
single-factor authentication procedure, based on those commonly used in the financial 
services industry, was compared with a two-factor approach where in addition to the 
knowledge-based step, a one-time passcode was generated using a hardware security 
token. Results were gathered on the usability and perceived security of the two methods 
described, together with call completion rates and call durations for the two methods. 
Significant differences were found between the two methods, with the two-factor version 
being perceived as offering higher levels of security than the single-factor authentication 
version; however, this gain was offset by significantly lower perceptions of usability, and 
lower ratings for convenience and ease of use for the two-factor version. In addition, the 
two-factor authentication version took longer for participants to complete. This research 
provides valuable empirical evidence of the trade-off between security and usability in 
automated systems.     
 
1 Introduction  
This paper describes an experiment to investigate user perceptions of the usability and 
security of single-factor and two-factor authentication methods in automated telephone 
banking.  
Most financial institutions worldwide offer some form of telephone banking to their 
customers, providing them with remote access to their accounts via the telephone from 
any location. The majority of these services are at least partly automated, which means 
callers hear a series of automated messages (typically, human speech recorded in a studio 
by a professional voice talent) and are invited to respond using either their voice or the 
keys on their telephone keypad, depending on the service design. An increasing number 
of these services moreover, are fully automated - allowing customers to carry out simple 
banking tasks such as balance enquiries and funds transfers over the phone without the 
need to speak to a human agent, often 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
While the use of Internet banking is growing rapidly
1
, automated telephony systems of 
this type continue to play an important role in banks’ service offerings. As an example, 
the real-life service deployed by one of the UK’s major banks (and on which the 
application in this research is based) has 4 million registered users and handles 5.5 
million calls per month, with continued development of the service being the focus of 
ongoing research at the Bank. 
Access to the existing service is via knowledge-based authentication (“what you know”), 
specifically in this case recall of a secret number or ‘PIN’. Other banks employ similar 
techniques involving the use of a PIN or alphanumeric password or some combination of 
the two, with knowledge-based authentication currently being the de facto standard for 
customer authentication in telephone banking and other remote channels across the U.K. 
financial services industry.  
However, whilst passwords and PINs remain a potent tool in the security of automated 
services when they are employed properly (O’Gorman, 2003), for users who have to 
remember multiple passwords and PINs across a number of applications the cognitive 
load of remembering each can become disadvantageous. Adams and Sasse (1999) suggest 
that four or five is the maximum number of unrelated, regularly used passwords that users 
can reasonably be expected to cope with. In practice, however, some studies suggest that 
in the workplace alone the number of passwords required can be as high as sixteen (Sasse 
et al., 2001).  
A common solution amongst users is to write the information down or use the same 
password or PIN for a number of applications, both of which have obvious security risks 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999; Dhamija and Perrig, 2000; Gaw and Felten, 2006). For example 
it is reported (Adams and Sasse, 1999) that at least 50% of respondents in a survey wrote 
down passwords as a result of password expiration policies in the workplace and the 
consequences of difficulties in remembering multiple passwords. Another study (Gaw 
and Felten, 2006) found that the majority of respondents had committed three or fewer 
passwords to memory for online use, and passwords were typically reused twice: the 
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 A Gartner survey showed that 73 percent of U.S. respondents regularly logged on to banking accounts and 
63 percent paid bills online (consumeraffairs.com, 2005) 
level of password reuse, moreover, rose over time as users acquired more ‘accounts’ but 
did not create more passwords. In fact, these figures seem conservative when compared 
to those of other studies (Dhamija and Perrig, 2000) which have found that while 
respondents had ten to fifty instances where passwords were required, in reality each had 
only one to seven unique passwords that were reused repeatedly. Other studies (Florêncio 
and Herley, 2007) report even more extreme figures where in a study of half a million 
Internet users each was found on average to have 25 passwords, reusing each for an 
average of 6.5 different sites. 
Users are also known to choose memorable (and therefore low security) passwords 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999; Bishop, 2005; Yan et al., 2004). PINs, moreover, have been 
shown to be more difficult to remember than passwords (Sasse et al., 2001) and anecdotal 
evidence exists of customers frequently using their date of birth as their PIN or writing 
down their PIN.  
Research on how to address some of these issues has included attempts to improve users’ 
choice of passwords through stricter selection policies, better education and/or suggested 
improvements during the selection process (Forget et al., 2007; 2008; Shay et al., 2010). 
However, awareness that such techniques can produce only limited results (Kuo et al., 
2006; Forget et al., 2008), together with recent growth in remote fraud (Hiltgen et al., 
2006) has meant that security concerns continue to grow across the various remote 
channels (Clarke et al., 2009; Sinclair and Smith, 2005). Users themselves have indicated 
concerns, with one study of 23,000 European Internet users reporting that 40% are 
deterred from using online banking by security worries (silicon.com, 2005).  
Increasingly, therefore, alternative and/or supplementary security mechanisms are being 
sought. One alternative to traditional passwords and PINs that has received considerable 
attention in recent years is graphical passwords (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000; Dhamija and 
Perrig, 2000; Dunphy et al., 2008, 2010; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). These, unlike 
alphanumeric passwords and codes, cannot be written down or shared easily. There is 
also some evidence to suggest that they are more memorable than their text-based 
equivalents (Chiasson et al., 2009). As a relatively new idea, however, there are few 
examples of graphical passwords actually in use (Dunphy et al., 2010) and as a 
consequence little is currently known about the potential for cross-interference and/or 
other memorability issues similar to those experienced with alphanumeric passwords 
should their use become commonplace in everyday life. They are also, of course, visual 
in nature making them unsuitable for use in the automated telephony context considered 
in this present paper. 
Another area of interest is multifactor authentication, which involves the use of more than 
one type of authenticator. Authentication components can generally be classified as 
belonging to one of three categories (the first of which, knowledge-based authentication, 
has already been discussed in some detail):  
i) what you know – information secret to the individual (e.g. password) 
ii) what you have – a physical token unique to the individual (e.g. ATM card) 
iii) what you are – some intrinsic property of the individual (e.g. fingerprint) 
Single-factor authentication uses one of these components as a means of verifying 
customer identity. The classic example is a PIN or password, as discussed above, 
although the use of biometric technology for single-factor authentication has also been 
investigated (Toledano et al., 2006).  
Two-factor authentication potentially provides enhanced security by combining two 
different authentication components; the advantage being that security can be maintained 
by one of the components if the other component is compromised (O’Gorman, 2003)2. A 
common example of multifactor authentication, found in the U.K., is the bankcard 
equipped with ‘Chip and PIN’ whereby cash withdrawal from an ATM or purchase of 
goods in person requires the user both to be in possession of the card and to know the 
secret PIN associated with it. Although some weaknesses have been identified in the 
technology (Murdoch et al., 2010), introduction of this system has had a considerable 
impact, with a significant decline in the incidence of bankcard related frauds in the six 
months following the system being made compulsory (Mannan and van Oorschot, 2007). 
Online banking fraud, on the other hand, rose by 55% in the same period (presumably in 
part as a consequence of the Chip and PIN initiative).  
Concerns over increased fraud via remote channels have thus led the banking industry to 
consider the use of two-factor authentication in their remote channels. Recent U.S. 
banking guidelines have suggested that single-factor authentication for Internet banking 
can be inadequate for certain transactions (FFIEC, 2005) whilst in the U.K. there are 
already several examples of banks that have added use of a card plus reader token to 
existing Internet banking security procedures for certain transactions. As yet, however, 
there do not appear to be any examples of two-factor authentication in a telephone 
banking context.  
In adopting new security procedures care needs to be taken since the changes may impact 
the perceived usability of the service. This is important since the usability of security 
measures is key for customer acceptance (O’Gorman, 2003); if the security processes are 
difficult to use, customers will avoid them or will fail to use them properly
3
. Significantly 
also, it has been suggested that poor usability can lead to a reduction in use of the remote 
channel (Knight, 2008). 
Usable security, however, is seen as something of an oxymoron. A commonly-held view 
is that usability and security are competing goals (Kainda et al., 2010; Sasse, 2004), with 
improvements in one dimension inevitably leading to a negative impact on the other. As 
recently as 2010, for example, a study of password policies across the Internet (Florêncio 
and Herley, 2010) employed a single measure (password strength) as a gauge of both 
security and usability, the assumption being that a secure password policy means poor 
usability and vice versa. The basis for this simplification, however, is somewhat limited. 
While it is true that a body of work on authentication using text-based passwords, several 
examples of which are mentioned above, has demonstrated that more secure passwords 
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 Generally, multifactor authentication that combines all three factors has not been widely applied 
(O’Gorman, 2003). 
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 A study found that although a password policy that allows weak passwords can lead to system 
compromise, an overly strong policy on the other hand can lead users to write passwords down - thereby 
inadvertently increasing system vulnerability overall (Shay and Bertino, 2009 - from Shay 2010). 
are more difficult for users to remember, these studies have however, tended to focus on 
specific measures such as password memorability and/or user behaviour in selecting 
passwords, rather than usability of the system or service as a whole. In fact, the field of 
what has been termed ‘Human Computer Interaction and Security’ or ‘HCISec’ (Kainda 
et al., 2010) is relatively recent; with commentators noting that very little work was 
focusing on the usability of secure systems (Kainda et al., 2010; Sasse, 2004). There are 
several examples of papers discussing the relationship between usability and security 
(Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005); however, there are relatively few studies available that 
provide empirical data on the topic. One example (Ion et al., 2010) compared the 
usability of different methods for secure device pairing, with the measure of usability in 
this case participants’ explicit choices between methods in different contexts. Another 
study (Piazzalunga et al., 2005) used an experimental approach to compare three different 
“security devices” (a card reader and two types of USB token) for email protection. They 
based their evaluation metrics on the usability sub-characteristics of the ISO 9126 
standard (ISO 1991) for the evaluation of software products (learnability, operability and 
attractiveness); the study itself, however, involved only ten users. 
A comprehensive evaluation of the usability of different security mechanisms (Weir et al., 
2009, 2010) reported results from two different studies of Internet banking. Usability 
evaluation in each case was based on the ISO (1998) definition of usability incorporating 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction and was assessed using a range of subjective and 
objective measures, together with user perceptions of security, convenience and ease of 
use. In the first study (Weir et al., 2009) the usability and security of two-factor 
authentication involving three different devices was examined, where a password was the 
first factor in each case. The results showed that in this context the usability of the system 
was sacrificed when increasing levels of security were applied. In the second study (Weir 
et al., 2010) the single-factor authentication procedure used in the existing service (two 
passwords) was compared with two different forms of two-factor authentication; 
password plus digital token, and password plus SMS text message on a mobile phone. 
Here, interestingly, the single-factor version was rated significantly less usable than both 
forms of two-factor authentication, contradicting the commonly-held assumption that 
increased security leads to poorer usability.  
The focus of most work on user authentication however has been on Internet services. 
With the exception of O’Gorman (2005, 2006a, 2006b), little or no research on usability 
and security has taken place in a voice communication context (in five years of the 
SOUPS
4
 conference, for example, not a single paper has focused on the telephony 
channel). This is important since there are considerable differences between the two 
channels; they have different modes of input, the telephony channel involves a time 
pressure to respond that does not exist in most Internet applications, it has no visual aids 
to memory; and its users, moreover, may be less technologically sophisticated than their 
Internet counterparts. 
This paper seeks to address some of the gaps identified in the literature on usability and 
security by describing an empirical evaluation of two different methods for user 
authentication within the context of a real-world automated telephone banking service. 
                                                 
4
 Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security 
The usability and security of the existing single-factor, knowledge-based procedure was 
compared to a two-factor approach involving use of a hardware token. A range of metrics 
was employed in order to provide a comprehensive evaluation, and in contrast to much of 
the other work described above (where participants are typically University students) 
participants in the experiment were real-life customers of the UK bank involved in the 
study. 
2 Experiment Approach 
Usability engineering emphasises the importance of directly observing actual and 
potential users (Karat, 1988). As such, a large component of any usability engineering 
work involves observing user behaviour in the workplace, at home and in usability 
laboratories. The experiment approach used in this research involves a contrastive study 
where two versions of the dialogue system, differing in some design characteristic, are 
experienced by participants in a laboratory setting. Participants are given detailed 
personal data as fictitious personae to use during the experiment and are asked to perform 
tasks typical of real-life use within the dialogue system. The results obtained from this 
procedure are considered to approximate the responses the service would generate in a 
real world context of use. 
In such controlled usability experiments, a repeated-measures design may be employed in 
which all participants try the different versions of a design being tested, the benefit being 
to allow comparisons to be made for each participant (Landauer, 1988). The order that 
participants experience designs can influence results - with habituation or fatigue effects 
causing bias. As a result, order of experience is balanced across the cohort in this type of 
design (Preece et al., 2002; Robson, 1983). Researcher bias can also be a problem in an 
experimental setting, thus procedures are standardised: each participant receives minimal 
instruction (priming) and follows the same session blueprint. In this way, the data 
collected can be used for statistical comparisons (Whiteside et al., 1988; Coolican, 1990). 
A rich set of data is collected based on performance measurements (such as time taken to 
complete tasks and success rates) and subjective attitudes to the experiences of using the 
different versions of the service. During the experiment, researchers make direct 
observations about the behaviour of the participants; these provide valuable insights into 
the non-verbal reactions of participants using the interactive systems.  
Participants’ attitudes are measured using questionnaires completed after experiencing 
each version of the service. The questionnaire employs a Likert format (Likert, 1932) 
where each usability attribute to be measured is presented to the participant in the form of 
a stimulus statement followed by an agree-disagree scale. The advantages of this format 
have been described (Coolican, 1990) as: 
 Participants prefer the Likert scaling technique because it is “more natural” to 
complete and because it maintains their direct involvement in the process. 
 The Likert technique has been shown to have a high degree of validity and reliability. 
 The Likert scale has been shown to be effective in measuring changes over time. 
Usability of a system is the efficiency, effectiveness and satisfaction of the system to 
perform specific goals in a particular environment (ISO, 1998). Previous research (e.g. 
Foster et al., 1993; Love, 1997; Love et al., 1992, 1994) has identified salient attributes of 
the perceived usability of interactive systems, and a usability questionnaire in Likert 
format has been constructed to measure these attributes. The questionnaire covers 
cognitive issues (e.g. level of concentration required by users, and how stressful the 
service was to use), the fluency and transparency of the system (e.g. ease of use and 
degree of complication), system performance (e.g. the efficiency of the application and 
users’ preferences for a human agent), and issues relating to the voice of the service (e.g. 
politeness and clarity). For the experiment detailed in this paper, the questionnaire was 
extended with two additional items, one referring specifically to the security of the 
system and the other relating to the amount of information that users were required to 
input into the system. See Appendix A for a full listing of the questionnaire. 
The 7-point Likert scales are used with a balance of positively and negatively worded 
stimulus statements in the questionnaire. On this scale, once the responses are normalised 
for statement polarity, a score over 4.0 represents a positive attitude; scores below 4.0 
represent negative attitudes to the identified attributes, and each participant’s overall 
attitude to the service can be measured by taking the mean of these numbers across all of 
the items in the questionnaire. A measure of the overall attitude to the service can then be 
obtained by averaging all the questionnaire results for participants who experienced that 
service. When replies to subjective questionnaire attributes are gathered from multiple 
users in this way, the average results can be considered an objective measure of system 
appeal (Nielsen, 1993). Moreover, when scores are collected for several competing 
versions of a system design, these can be compared and used to determine which is most 
satisfying to use. 
3 Experiment Details 
3.1 Authentication Approaches Compared 
Each of the authentication strategies investigated was set within the context of an already 
established automated telephone banking service from a major UK bank. The two 
versions of the service employed in the experiment were based on the existing customer-
facing service and differed only in the customer authentication part of the dialogue. Both 
began with a welcome message, followed by capture of the caller’s account number and 
sort code (for identification purposes). Following entry of a valid account number and 
sort code, the authentication dialogue took place.  
Two approaches to customer authentication were compared in the experiment. The 
single-factor approach is based on a “what you know” technique deployed in the existing 
service - recall of two digits, selected at random, from a six-digit secret number 
previously registered by the user and known only to them (“Please give the Xth digit of 
your secret number.” followed in a separate stage by “…and the Yth digit.”).  
The two-factor approach examined in the experiment contains an additional “what you 
have” component as well as the two digits from a secret number. Various hardware 
authentication tokens are currently available for use in enhanced security. Table 1 details 
three types of hardware tokens, together with pros and cons for each.   
Device Method of code generation Pros Cons 
Portable key 
fob 
User presses button on device 
and access code is displayed 
Inexpensive 
Hardware to keep / 
carry around 
Smartcard 
and reader 
User inserts card into reader, 
types in PIN and access code 
is displayed 
Compatible with 
a Chip and PIN 
world 
Hardware to keep 
A more expensive 
solution 
Mobile 
phone 
User requests a text message 
containing access code 
Inexpensive 
 
Relies on ownership 
of a mobile phone. 
Signal reception. 
Table 1: Hardware Authentication Tokens  
In this research, the portable device was used as the authentication token - a security 
device which outputs a one-time access code. The device is a small keyfob-style device 
weighing 10g, including the battery. It features an (up to) 8-character LCD display and a 
single push button. An on-board real time clock provides time synchronous encryption. 
After one push on the button a unique one-time six-digit access code is shown on the 
display. In the system investigated in the experiment, the user inputs (all of) this one-time 
access code when prompted by the telephone banking service, as an additional security 
step after the account number, sort code and secret number prompts. The security key for 
the generation of an access code on a customer’s access device is linked via their account 
to the same security key for code generation on the bank’s server. The authenticating 
server uses the same algorithm as the device, using the time and serial code of each 
customer’s device to verify their inputted access code. The code is updated every 30-60 
seconds. Typically the server accepts only the last three codes. The customer cannot lock 
the access device, as no PIN entry is required.  
Using the single-factor approach, since there are ten possible values for each of the two 
digits (0-9), the chance of a fraudster guessing both digits correctly on a single attempt is 
1 in 100. With three attempts (as allowed by the service before the customer account is 
‘locked’ and the caller is transferred to a human agent for further authentication) the risk 
rises to 3 in 100 or 3%.  
With the two-factor strategy, assuming the fraudster is not in possession of the device, the 
possibility of guessing a six-digit passcode correctly on any given attempt is 1 in 1 
million. With three attempts at a single code allowed this rises to 3 in 1 million. Further, 
when combined with the secret number stages described above, the chance of a fraudster 
successfully passing both authentication stages is multiplicative i.e. 3/100 x 3/1,000,000 
= 9 in 100 million or 0.000009%. 
Numerically, thus, the two-factor approach is significantly more secure than the single-
factor strategy, by several orders of magnitude. This, although it does not take into 
account the possibility of the token being lost or stolen, is obviously of considerable 
attraction to the bank, leading them to consider deploying use of the token in telephone 
banking. It is, however, recognised that the additional security offered by such an 
approach is only of benefit if customers are both able to use the token and understand its 
value; hence the motivation for this research.  
After successful authentication, as in the existing system the customer can select from 
various banking services such as checking their balance or searching recent transactions 
applied to their account. 
3.2 Research Aims  
The experiment was designed to explore user perceptions of the usability and security of 
two different authentication approaches in automated telephone banking.  
The experiment hypotheses considered here were:  
H1: The two authentication methods will be different in terms of perceived usability.  
H2: The two authentication methods will be different in terms of a set of four 
comparative ratings (quality, convenience, security and ease of use).  
H3: The two authentication methods will be different in terms of user preference. 
Each hypothesis was tested using statistical tests on the measures of usability, quality and 
preference taken for each authentication method after direct experience. 
3.3 Participants 
Sixty-two telephone banking users took part in the experiment, in a design that was 
approximately balanced for age and gender. All were customers of the UK bank involved 
in the study. Equal numbers of participants from each gender were recruited, 31 males, 31 
females. The sample consisted of slightly more older participants than younger 
participants; 61.3% were age 35 years or over, 38.7% were under age 35 years.   
Participants were asked how often, if at all, they telephoned the Bank. The vast majority 
(85.5%) had experience of phoning the existing, automated service. A majority (54.8%) 
called a few times a year or less, but a substantial minority (30.6%) called at least once a 
month. 
3.4 Procedure 
All participants made one telephone call to each version of the service in a repeated-
measures design. A persona description sheet included a note of ‘their’ secret number; 
and a bank card was included with their (dummy) account details (showing their account 
number and sort code). A different persona with different account details was supplied 
for each version of the service. A task sheet was provided for the participants prior to 
making each call. 
Prior to experiencing the two-factor version, participants were also given the keyfob 
device with the following (spoken) description: 
“For this version of the service you will also need to use this device, which provides you with 
a unique access code to enter during your call. The access code changes frequently, making 
it very difficult for anyone else to know all your details. Have a look at the device and try it 
out.”  
In order to focus on the identification and verification part of the telephone call, 
participants were asked to carry out a simple banking task (finding out a balance on their 
account) in each call.  
In order to quantify the differences between the two methods, attitude questionnaires 
were posed after exposure to each of the different authentication designs. A short 
debriefing interview after the main experiment elicited information from participants 
about their reactions to the different authentication methods; their likes, dislikes and 
suggestions for improvements. Participants were also asked which option they preferred, 
by rating the two methods in terms of overall quality, convenience, ease of use and 
security on a 0-30 point scale labelled ‘worst’ to ‘best’, with the results analysed as a 
quality rating and as a rank order of preference.  
4 Results  
4.1 Caller Behaviour and Performance  
During the sessions, the phone calls were automatically logged to report caller behaviour 
and performance metrics.  
4.1.1 Timing Data for Caller Identification and Verification (ID&V)  
Participants were timed in their calls from the start to completion of the identification and 
verification process (ID&V). In the single-factor version, this comprised account number, 
sort code and 2-from-6 secret number digit input. In the two-factor version, this involved 
the account number, sort code and secret number steps plus an additional access code 
input of 6 digits.  
The overall mean completion timing for the single-factor version was 41.96 seconds, and 
for the two-factor was 60.06 seconds. The timings for each participant for each version 
were compared in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with the authentication version as the 
within-subject variable, and with age, gender and order of experiencing the two versions 
as the between-subject factors. The results showed that the difference between versions 
was highly significant (p < 0.001). However, this is as expected since the two-factor 
approach to authentication does not replace the single-factor approach but instead adds an 
additional stage to it. Therefore the durations for identification and verification of the 
two-factor version would be expected to be longer. A significant interaction of version 
with order of experiencing the two versions was also found (p < 0.001). When 
experienced first, the single-factor version took an average of 44 seconds; when 
experienced second the mean time for this version was just less than 40 seconds. The 
two-factor version experienced first took an average of 64 seconds; experienced second it 
took 56 seconds. The order effect indicates a learning experience, with both versions 
taking longer when experienced first than when experienced second. Given that the two-
factor approach incorporates the single-factor procedure this is not entirely surprising; it 
does, however, illustrate the importance of balancing the order in which participants 
experience the two different versions in order to obtain a true gauge of the mean 
authentication duration in each case.
An interaction of gender with version was less strong, but statistically significant at p = 
0.039. Female participants took the shortest time with the single-factor version, less than 
their male counterparts. Both male and female participants took similar lengths of time to 
complete the two-factor version (no significant difference).  
4.1.2 Behavioural Data  
Using the single-factor version, 90% of participants completed the task in their first 
attempt at the call. The other 10% failed due to problems at the account number and sort 
code input stages: they were all able to complete the task on the second call attempt. For 
the two-factor version, 74% of participants completed the task on their first attempt, 18% 
on the second call attempt and another 8% required a third attempt to complete the task. 
Seven out of the sixteen participants that had failed call attempts in this version failed at 
the account number and sort code input stages, that is, due to problems not associated 
with the authentication method. The other nine participants failed at the secret number or 
access code input stages (seven of these were in the older age group). The secret number 
stage requests two random digits from a 6-digit string. This was confused here with the 
access code, also a 6-digit string. The dynamic access code would therefore need to be 
better differentiated from the secret number to avoid these errors.    
For the two-factor version, participants’ first responses at the access code input stage 
were observed, that is, the first time they encountered this stage regardless of any 
previously failed call attempts (for example, errors at the account number, sort code or 
secret number stages). Some 90% of participants completed this stage at the first attempt. 
The remaining 10% of participants failed this stage at the first attempt and required 
further attempts; three of them gave no response within the 8-second response window, 
and the other three made errors inputting the code. Five of these six participants were 
successful in further attempts at this stage within the same call, the final participant being 
the only one to require a separate, additional call to successfully navigate the access code 
stage. 
4.2 Usability Results  
4.2.1 Overall Usability Scores  
The mean usability scores derived from the usability questionnaires were 5.56 (on a 7-
point scale) for the single-factor version and 5.31 for the two-factor version. A repeated 
measures ANOVA was carried out on the scores for each version, taking age, gender and 
order of experience as between-subject factors. A significant difference on usability 
between the two versions was found (p = 0.024). The usability of the single-factor 
authentication method was judged to be significantly higher than the two-factor access 
device version.  
In addition, the interaction between the usability of each service and the order of 
experience indicated a moderately significant effect (p = 0.036). Participants in both 
order groups rated the single-factor version higher than the two-factor version; however, 
the difference was considerably larger amongst those who used the two-factor version 
first (single factor 5.70. two-factor 5.26) than in the group who used the standard, single-
factor version first, where scores for the two versions were fairly similar (single factor 
5.40, two-factor 5.37). 
Paired samples t-tests on this data indicated no significant differences between scores 
awarded to the two versions in the order single-factor followed by two-factor. There was, 
however, a highly significant difference in the scores awarded to the versions in the order 
two-factor followed by single-factor, with the single-factor version scoring significantly 
higher than the two-factor version, p = 0.002. This appears to be a contrastive scoring 
effect, as these participants had the opportunity to contrast the single-factor security 
procedure favourably with the two-factor procedure they had already experienced. 
The interaction between the authentication method and the age group of participants 
showed another significant effect (p = 0.013), as illustrated in Table 2.  
Age Group Single-factor 2-factor 
18-34 years 5.46 5.48 
35 years and over 5.58 5.16 
Table 2: Mean Usability Scores for Each Version by Age Group 
Younger participants scored both interfaces similarly, with the two-factor version 
achieving a very slightly elevated mean score (not significant). However, older 
participants scored the two-factor method significantly lower than their younger 
counterparts, at the same time giving the single-factor version higher scores than younger 
users. Paired samples t-tests showed that there was a highly significant difference in 
scores for the two versions given by older participants, awarding significantly higher 
scores to the single-factor version. A majority of participants who appeared to confuse 
the secret number and access code of the two-factor version were in the older age group 
(as described in the previous Behavioural Data section). Although based on small 
numbers of participants, this may in part explain the differences between the two age 
groups with respect to the overall usability data.  
4.2.2 Analysis of Individual Usability Attributes  
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on each of the 22 attributes measured by 
the Likert usability questionnaire for the two authentication methods tested in the 
experiment, again taking age, gender and order of experience as the between-subject 
factors.  
A number of differences between the two versions were found. The single-factor version 
scored better in cognitive terms, with less concentration required (p = 0.002), less 
confusion (p = 0.007), less complication (p = 0.011) and less frustration with usage (p = 
0.023) than the two-factor version. The single-factor version was also rated more 
positively in terms of not being too fast (p = 0.029), it was found to be easier to use (p = 
0.025) with fewer details to input (p < 0.001) than the two-factor version. However, 
security was not as highly perceived as with the two-factor version of the service. The 
two-factor version scored significantly higher in terms of security (p < 0.001) at 6.07 on 
the 7-point scale compared with 5.59 for the single-factor version.   
Investigation was made on how the two age groups reacted to the different authentication 
methods. For the single-factor version, older participants tended to give slightly higher 
scores than younger participants, significantly higher for knew what to do (p = 0.037) and 
friendliness (p = 0.050); however they scored significantly lower than younger 
participants in terms of stress (p = 0.046), that is they felt significantly more stressed than 
younger participants when using the service. For the two-factor version, older participants 
scored significantly lower than younger participants in terms of confusion (p = 0.032), 
flustered (p = 0.011), stress (p = 0.026) and frustration (p = 0.039). Both age groups gave 
very positive reactions to the voice clarity, politeness and security of the two-factor 
service.  
The two versions were then compared within each age group separately. The younger 
participants perceived the two-factor version as requiring more concentration (p = 0.043) 
and having too many details to input (p = 0.038) compared to the single-factor version. 
However, they perceived the two-factor version as more efficient (p = 0.050) and secure 
(p = 0.008). Amongst the older participants, many significant differences were found 
between the two versions; in this group the single-factor version was perceived as being 
more usable in terms of confusion (p < 0.001), concentration (p = 0.018), flustered (p = 
0.027), frustration (p = 0.015), complication (p = 0.003), knew what to do (p = 0.002), 
ease of use (p = 0.020), willingness to use again (p = 0.011), friendly (p = 0.017), 
enjoyment (p = 0.020) and amount of details to input (p = 0.003). One exception was that 
older participants felt the two-factor version was more secure (p = 0.032) than the single-
factor version.  
4.3 Quality Rating Results  
Overall quality ratings as well as ratings for convenience, security and ease of use for the 
two versions of authentication were recorded on a 30-point scale. The mean results are 
shown in Table 3. (These data are based on a cohort of 61 participants, as one participant 
was unable to complete the debriefing interview due to time constraints.) 
Rating Single-factor 2-factor 
Overall Quality 21.66 20.00 
Convenience 23.89 19.59 
Security 22.29 25.31 
Ease of Use 25.42 22.78 
Table 3: Ratings for the Two Authentication Methods 
In the same way as the usability results, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on 
each of these quality ratings with age, gender and order of experience as the between-
subjects factors.  
In terms of overall quality, there was no significant difference between the two versions 
and no significant interactions or between-subjects effects were found.  
In terms of convenience, there was a highly significant difference between the two 
authentication methods (p < 0.001), with the single-factor version being seen as 
significantly more convenient than the two-factor version. There were no significant 
interactions or between-subjects effects.  Participants were asked to comment on their 
reasons for their response. One participant stated that the two-factor version “was too 
much effort. The [single-factor version] is less hassle”.  
In terms of security, there was also a highly significant difference between the two 
authentication methods (p < 0.001), this time with the two-factor version being seen as 
significantly more secure than the single-factor version. Again participants were asked to 
comment on their reasons for their response. One participant stated that “[the single-
factor] security wasn't too bad but when I get to [two-factor version] it gives you that 
extra bit of security.” 
There was also a significant interaction between perceived security and age group (p = 
0.013), the interaction is shown in Figure 1. Younger participants gave a significantly 
lower security rating to the single-factor version (A) than older participants. Younger 
participants also gave a significantly higher rating to the two-factor version of the service 
(B) than older participants, who saw much less difference between the two services in 
terms of security.  
 
Figure 1: Security Rating by Age Group 
 
As with the security item on the usability questionnaire, both age groups rated the two-
factor version as being more secure than the single-factor version. However, according to 
the ratings scale, the younger age group judged this difference more salient than the older 
age group. The usability data did not show this difference in attitude towards the issue of 
security between the two age groups. However, the usability questionnaire gathers 
immediate reactions to the experience of using the service. The ratings scales are 
administered after experience of both versions are completed and may encompass 
consideration of other real-world factors such as the safe-keeping of the device itself and 
how the device operates.  
Finally, in terms of ease of use, there was a highly significant difference between the two 
authentication methods, p = 0.006, with the single-factor version being seen as 
significantly more easy to use than the two-factor version. There were no significant 
interactions and no between-subjects effects. Again participants were asked to comment 
on their reasons for their response. One participant stated that “[the single-factor] was 
easier because I am used to this kind of thing. The other one [two-factor version] would 
be difficult to remember carrying the device with me.”  
4.4 Rank Order Preference Results  
The quality ratings obtained for each version were recorded simultaneously, allowing 
direct comparison of both versions. Therefore for each participant, the expressed quality 
score was also converted into a rank order for each version. The results are shown in 
Table 4. (Note again that one participant was unable to complete the debriefing interview 
due to time constraints.) 
Ranked Best Overall Preference Convenience Security Ease of Use 
Single-factor 32 (52.5%) 42 (68.9%) 4 (6.6%) 30 (49.2%) 
2-factor 26 (42.6%) 9 (14.8%) 46 (75.4%) 9 (14.8%) 
Rated equally 3 (4.9%) 10 (16.4%) 11 (18.0%) 22 (36.1%) 
Table 4: Frequency Ranked Best 
Examining the 58 participants whose quality ratings expressed an overall preference 
between the two authentication methods, a binomial test found no significant difference 
in votes for the two services; although slightly more participants expressed a preference 
for the single-factor version this was not significant.  
In terms of convenience, excluding those who rated both services equally, significantly 
more participants rated the current, single-factor authentication method best (binomial, p 
< 0.001). The same was also true for ease of use, albeit a slightly less significant result 
(binomial, p = 0.001). In terms of security, however, significantly more participants rated 
the two-factor service variant best (binomial test excluding those who ranked both 
services equally, p < 0.001). Note that all four participants who ranked the single-factor 
service best in terms of security were in the older age group. 
4.5 Relationship between Usability and Comparative Ratings 
It was of interest to investigate possible relationships between usability perceptions 
(taken from the repeated measure attitude questionnaires) and the comparative ratings for 
quality, convenience, security and ease of use. Pearson correlations were computed 
between the differences in usability of the two authentication methods and the differences 
in each of the comparative ratings, as shown in Table 5. 
Possible Relationship Correlation 
Usability and Overall Quality 0.46, 0.21, <.001 
Usability and Convenience 0.42, 0.18, .001 
Usability and Security 0.244, 0.06, .058 
Usability and Ease of Use 0.54, 0.30, <.001 
Notes: Displayed Data: Pearsons’ r, R², p. 
Table 5: Correlations between Measures of Usability and Quality, Convenience, 
Security and Ease of Use for the Two Versions 
The usability difference between the two versions was highly significantly correlated to 
the perceived difference in overall quality, convenience and ease of use between the two 
services. In each case a strong positive relationship was indicated.    
The relationship between the difference in usability and the difference in security 
between versions, although approaching significance, p = 0.058, was not significant.  
4.6 Qualitative Results 
Towards the end of their research session, participants made comments on their likes, 
dislikes and preferences on a wide range of issues related to methods of authentication. 
Some typical responses are presented here.  
4.6.1 Likes and Dislikes 
The single-factor method was reported as being easy to use, short and straightforward. 
The main dislikes commented on for this version of the service related to the automated 
service in general rather than the method of authentication.  
The two-factor method was reported for the additional security participants judged that it 
offered. The main dislikes and suggestions made in reference to this method included 
comments about disliking having to carry a device with them in order to use the service, 
that the procedure takes longer having more numbers to enter and that the numbers on the 
screen of the device could be made larger. It was suggested that the service should add a 
question at the beginning of the service “Do you have your access device?” in order to 
check that the user can proceed with this method of verification. A number of comments 
were also made suggesting users were unsure as to how the device operated or the means 
by which it provided additional security e.g. “It doesn't really add extra security. There 
was no verification it was me.” 
4.6.2 Physical Attributes of Security Device  
Participants were asked what they thought about the size of the hardware keyfob device 
they used: 80.4% thought it was “about the right size”, with the remaining participants 
equally split between those who thought it was too big and those who thought it was too 
small. All participants stated that they thought the display was easy to read.  
4.6.3 When to Use Security Device 
Participants were asked when they thought they should be asked to use the security 
device in an automated telephone banking service: 54.1% stated that it should be in every 
call, whereas 31.1% stated that it should be used as enhanced security only in order to 
authorise a high value transaction; 13.1% of participants stated that they should not be 
asked use the device at all in this context.   
4.6.4 Observations by Researchers  
The researchers who guided participants through the research sessions recorded some 
observations on participants’ handling of the device. Most, they noted, used their thumb 
to press the button to display the code. Almost all used only one hand to interact with the 
device. When inputting the code many placed the device on the desk but some kept it in 
their hand whilst typing the code, clamping the telephone handset under their chin using 
their neck and shoulder.  
5 Discussion of Hypotheses  
5.1 Hypothesis H1: Perceived Usability  
There was evidence to support the hypothesis that the telephone banking services with 
single-factor and two-factor authentication approaches were significantly different in 
terms of perceived usability. The single-factor authentication process was found to be 
significantly more usable than the two-factor process, p = 0.024.  
The single-factor version rated a mean score of 5.56, indicating that it was seen as a 
highly user-friendly method. The two-factor modified version of the telephone banking 
service was rated significantly lower with a mean score of 5.31. However, the usability 
score is still above 5.0 on the 7-point scale indicating it was a usable method in the broad 
sense.  
In terms of the individual usability attributes, the single-factor approach was seen as 
superior to the two-factor approach in being less confusing, requiring less concentration, 
causing less frustration, being less complicated, not being too fast, being easier to use 
and not having too many details to input. In contrast, the two-factor approach was rated 
significantly higher on the attribute of security, and scored highly positively in this regard, 
although perceptions of security were reasonable for the single-factor process as well.  
5.2 Hypothesis H2: Comparative Ratings  
The comparative ratings included overall quality, convenience, security and ease of use.  
In terms of overall quality, there was no evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
quality scores for the two different authentication approaches in telephone banking were 
significantly different. There were no significant interactions or between-subject effects.  
In terms of convenience, there was significant evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
two different authentication approaches in telephone banking were perceived differently. 
The single-factor version was seen as significantly more convenient than the two-factor 
version.  
In terms of security, there was also significant evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
two different authentication approaches in telephone banking were perceived differently. 
The two-factor version was seen as significantly more secure than the single-factor 
version. There was a significant interaction with age group. Younger participants 
appreciated the additional security provided by the two-factor approach, marking the 
single-factor version significantly lower than two-factor. However, on the ratings scale, 
older participants appeared to be less aware of the security issue, marking both services 
similarly, possibly due to a lack of understanding of how the technology works.  
Finally, there was significant evidence to support the hypothesis that the ease of use 
scores for the two different authentication approaches in telephone banking were different. 
The single-factor version was seen as significantly easier to use than the two-factor 
version. 
Mean usability scores were not significantly correlated with security ratings, but were 
significantly correlated with overall quality, convenience and ease of use. Higher security 
ratings were accompanied by lower usability, depicting the difficulty in providing usable 
security at the user interface.  
5.3 Hypothesis H3: Preferences  
There was no evidence to support the hypothesis that the two authentication methods 
were different in terms of overall preference. There were mixed opinions on the rank 
order, with 32 of the 61 participants preferring the single-factor version, and 26 preferring 
the two-factor version.  
The single-factor version was ranked as the most convenient by a significant margin, and 
as easier to use; whereas, the two-factor version was ranked as the most secure by a 
significant margin.  
6 Conclusions  
This experiment explored user attitudes towards the usability and security of single-factor 
and two-factor methods for authentication in the context of an already established 
automated telephone banking service. The results show some interesting differences 
between the two authentication approaches which, together with participant preferences 
expressed in the interview, can inform decisions on the use of two-factor authentication 
involving physical tokens in a telephony context, and specifically a telephone banking 
service.  
In terms of performance, unsurprisingly the two-factor process involving an additional 
stage took significantly longer to complete than the single-factor method (p < 0.001). 
Perhaps more surprisingly, use of the push-button device to obtain and enter a one-time 
access code caused relatively few problems for users, the large majority of whom (90%) 
successfully entered the access code at the first attempt on reaching this dialogue stage. 
The remainder did not respond or made errors when inputting the code in response to the 
initial prompt. However, most of these (five out of six) went on to successfully give the 
access code within the same call, with just one participant requiring an additional call to 
successfully navigate the access code stage. This is encouraging as it might have been 
expected that simultaneous use of the telephone handset and key fob under the (moderate) 
time constraints imposed by the automated system prompts could cause significant 
difficulty for users.  
In fact, data logged by the system showed that problems in the two-factor approach were 
actually caused by confusion between the secret number and the access code; both 
numbers being six digits in length, and used after one another. Nine participants (14.5%) 
failed at least one call in the two-factor version for this reason. Note, however, that the 
problem in this case was not due to interference in memory between multiple user 
‘passwords’ in the sense described earlier, since in the experiment neither six-digit 
number had to be recalled from memory (the fixed secret number was supplied on the 
persona sheet given to each participant and the dynamic access code was displayed on the 
device as it would be in real life). It is possible that simultaneous display of both numbers 
(an artefact of the experiment) may have influenced participant behaviour in this regard; 
however it seems likely that this confusion is also likely to arise in real life where the 
access code at least is on display whilst participants are on the telephone during the 
automated dialogue. For this reason, it may be beneficial to avoid such similarities in the 
information required of the user. There may be less confusion if the one-time access code 
contains a different number of digits to the secret number.   
Both approaches to customer authentication obtained a mean usability rating above 5.0 on 
the 7-point scale, indicating a generally positive reaction to the services (5.56 for the 
single-factor version and 5.31 for the two-factor version). There was, however, 
significant evidence that the single-factor knowledge-based authentication process was 
more usable than the two-factor process employing an additional one-time access code 
from a small, portable device. The single-factor approach was rated (moderately) 
significantly higher overall (p=0.024), and for seven of the twenty-two usability attributes 
measured in the experiment. The two-factor version, in contrast, scored significantly 
higher only on the issue of security.  
Overall ratings for ease of use, convenience and security exhibited a similar pattern, with 
the single-factor approach considered significantly easier to use and more convenient 
than the two-factor version, but less secure. (Note again, however, that in general both 
versions were rated highly on each of these dimensions.) 
Interestingly, however, the overall quality ratings for the two services were not 
statistically significantly different (both were rated highly). In terms of rank ordering also, 
although slightly more participants expressed a preference for the single-factor version 
this was not significant. Analysis of user comments showed that although participants 
liked the single-factor version as it was easy, straightforward and quick, they also valued 
the extra security provided by the two-factor service.  
From a practical point of view these data are likely to be a comfort to those considering 
use of a similar (two-factor token-based) approach to authentication. Although the gain in 
security obtained through such an approach is associated with a decrease in the usability 
of the service it could be argued that the effect is relatively moderate, given users’ (lack 
of) overall preference and the positive usability score awarded to the two-factor version. 
Thus, it may be that on balance the gain in security afforded by use of a token is of such 
magnitude and significance that this outweighs the apparently moderate cost in terms of 
usability. This, however, is a business discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper.  
From a research point of view the results show that participants in the experiment did 
understand the added security provided by use of the physical token. As noted above 
however, this gain in security was obtained at a cost to the usability of the service. 
Results from the study thus corroborate the findings of previous research on two-factor 
authentication for Internet banking (Weir et al., 2009), which found that usability and 
convenience were sacrificed when added layers of security were added to the system. 
More generally, these data provide valuable empirical evidence of the trade-off between 
usability and security in automated systems that is not often evident in other research in 
this area. Crucially, moreover, it does so in an automated telephony context. 
6.1 Future Work 
This study indicated that an extended authentication procedure for automated telephone 
banking does boost perceptions of security, but at a cost to usability. However, any 
negative impact on usability may be guarded against by design changes after observations 
made during this study. As described above, one issue found was confusion between the 
secret number and the access code. More clarity could be achieved for users by 
differentiating the number of digits in these numbers. Alternatively, the access device 
could generate an alphanumeric code, which would further differentiate it from the secret 
number. The use of alphanumerics in an automated telephone dialogue would, however, 
entail an increase in complexity for the speech recognition system. It would be beneficial 
to measure any effects on usability and perceptions of security with these new 
authentication versions, together with any error rates or differences in call timings 
between the new versions.    
An interesting facet of the results, in part related to this issue, is the suggestion that 
attitudes towards security may be affected by demographic factors such as the age of the 
user. Participants in the older age group rated the usability of the two-factor method 
significantly lower than their younger counterparts, at the same time rating the single-
factor version higher. (Younger users rated the usability of the two versions much more 
similarly.) On closer inspection it was found that a majority of the participants who 
appeared to confuse the secret number and access code (seven out of nine) were in the 
older age group. Although based on small numbers of participants this may provide a clue 
to the difference in attitude between the two age groups with respect to usability. It may 
also be resolved in part by better differentiation of the secret number and access code as 
described above. Those in the older age group, however, also viewed the difference in 
security between the two authentication methods as being much less than younger 
participants, possibly due to a lack of understanding of the technology. Such results 
highlight the importance of including a wide range of end users in research on security in 
automated systems, and provide interesting pointers for future possible research focusing 
on demographic factors. 
The hardware device itself was criticised as being inconvenient to carry around. It was 
also found that for some participants, the access device was a mystery in terms of what 
actual security it provided and how it worked. In a real world context, it may be possible 
to mitigate this with effective customer literature. In an experimental setting, this could 
be achieved by using draft customer communications as part of the research blueprint that 
the participant could read prior to interacting with a two-factor authentication service.  
In this study, usability scores were higher for the version of the service experienced 
second. In a real life context, it would be assumed that users become more adept at using 
the service with experience of using it. In an experimental setting, accustomed usage 
could be accounted for by allowing more than one use with each version of the service. 
Any habituation effects could then be measured by administering the usability 
questionnaires after each usage as well as after each version.  
Finally, this experiment examined use of the device in a particular setting, that of a 
relatively quiet environment with a desk and landline telephone. Researchers observed 
that participants on the whole either placed the device on the desk during the telephone 
call, or held the device in their hand whilst balancing the telephone under their chin using 
their neck and shoulder. It would be interesting, therefore, to examine the effects of 
different environments on their use of the device and the resulting usability and 
performance e.g. in the absence of a surface on which to place the device (as might occur 
when travelling or sitting on an easy chair) and/or using a mobile telephone, which is 
more difficult to fix under the chin in the manner described. 
Appendix A. Items in Usability Questionnaire 
Statements were presented in a randomised order for each participant.  
Q1   I thought the service was too complicated. 
Q2   When I was using the service I always knew what I was expected to do. 
Q3   I thought the service was efficient. 
Q4   I liked the voice. 
Q5   I would be happy to use the service again. 
Q6   I found the service confusing to use. 
Q7   The service was friendly. 
Q8   I felt under stress when using the service.  
Q9   I felt this service was secure.  
Q10   The service was too fast for me. 
Q11  I thought the service was polite. 
Q12  I found the service frustrating to use. 
Q13  I enjoyed using the service. 
Q14  I felt flustered when using the service. 
Q15  I think the service needs a lot of improvement. 
Q16   I had to enter too many details during the service.  
Q17  I felt the service was easy to use. 
Q18  I would prefer to talk to a human being. 
Q19  I thought the voice was very clear. 
Q20  I felt that the service was reliable. 
Q21  I had to concentrate hard to use the service. 
Q22  I did not feel in control when using the service. 
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